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ESSAY
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYMAKING
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.*
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' scholars have delved
into every nook and cranny of judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation.2 Yet inquiry into the more subtle and practically
potent questions involving the broad category of review of adminis-
trative policymaking has languished. Perhaps administrative law
scholars have mined the Chevron doctrine sufficiently and the time
has come to rediscover the rich question of judicial review of this
other source of policy. James Landis, the oracle of administrative
law, observed in a landmark essay that "[tihe ultimate test of the
administrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the
fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy
on a record of their own making."' The founding generation of
administrative law recognized that the administrative process
grew out of the desire to develop a mechanism for effective policy-
making.4
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. B.A. University of
Maryland, 1966; J.D. George Washington University, 1969; LL.M. University of Chicago, 1975.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting out a two step scheme for reviewing administrative
agency interpretation of statutes agencies are charged with administering by Congress).
2. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
834 nn.6-8 (2001).
3. JAMEs LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATivE PROCESS 39 (1938).
4. See, e.g., LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 612-13 (1965)
(noting that policymaking is a duty of agencies and that delegation to hearing examiners
would be an abdication of this duty). But see Keith Werhan, DelegalizingAdministrative Law,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 423 (observing that certain recent reforms are undermining the policy-
making role for agencies contemplated by the founding generation of administrative law).
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This Essay asserts a categoric difference between judicial review
of statutory interpretation and review of administrative policy-
making. Ordinarily, the judiciary confronts statutory language de
novo. In the administrative process, however, a reviewing court has
before it a prior authoritative treatment of the statutory language.
The existence of another "faithful agent" between the legislature
and the courts instrumentally changes the role of the courts.' The
Chevron doctrine recognizes one aspect of this instrumental
difference. It demands that the courts accept that an authorized
agent of the legislature has pronounced on the topic and it compels
courts to give that meaning more weight than they would
interpretations offered by ordinary litigants. It says that when a
court is confronting an administrative interpretation of a statute,
they must accept that interpretation if the meaning gleaned from
the statute is not contrary to the clear meaning of the language and
is reasonable. As to interpreting statutory language, the courts
must give due deference to the prior agent, the agency created to
execute the legislative program, and that deference is defined by
the Chevron doctrine. In a sense, the judicial role here is not
distinguishable in kind from the role played by courts in any
statutory interpretation; the additional element is the injection of
an authoritative agent.
The doctrine does not cover another category of administrative
decisions, however. Specifically, the Chevron doctrine does not
address those agency decisions executing statutory language
through the authorized creation of policy itself. These adminis-
trative decisions do not interpret language but actually carry
forward the mandate of the statute; in doing so they extend the
policy-making process begun by the legislation rather than figuring
out what policy the language conveys. In this context, the judicial
role cannot be defined as some special variety of the statutory
interpretation. Rather, it must be conceived as a distinct category
5. Professor Manning argued that the best understanding ofthe Constitution is that the
courts are to be "faithful agents" of the legislature. John Manning, Deriving Rules of
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001). Certainly,
in the context of statutory interpretations, they should be agents, even if the degree of
faithfulness is contestable. This Essay cannot, and need not, explore the various concepts of
statutory interpretation. For a more in-depth analysis of these concepts, see WILLIAM
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2000).
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of judicial review. Although some of the impressive thinking
that has constructed the Chevron doctrine, as well as the
Chevron opinion itself, may be useful, review law about this
category of administrative decisions, policymaking, must be
developed independently. This Essay reaches into the existing law
of review of administrative policymaking, informed by the work
done in developing the Chevron doctrine, to urge a renewed
attention to this category of judicial review.
Although agencies are generally designed with dominant
authority over their special policy-making area, courts retain
some function over administrative policymaking.6 The complex
questions concerning the proper allocation of authority between
the courts and the agencies-and, indirectly, the legislatures-in
policymaking needs attention. Administrative law has well-
established principles to guide courts in carrying out this respon-
sibility. Nonetheless, the opportunity remains for administrative
law specialists to profitably modernize these principles, perhaps
utilizing the massive body of work concerning review of statutory
interpretation under the Chevron doctrine. Two very recent cases,
Christensen v. Harris County' and United States v. Mead Corp.,'
demonstrate the utility of such a transfer from review of statutory
interpretation to review of policymaking.
The Chevron doctrine provides important insights into the
allocation of authority to glean policy from legislation, the
assignment of authority over statutory interpretation. Review of
administrative policymaking, however, has not received commen-
surate attention, especially given its importance as a source of
government policy. Just as Justice Stevens' opinion in Chevron
influenced the development of the Chevron doctrine, it may
also serve as a springboard for this inquiry. In his concluding
summation Justice Stevens observed:
6. See HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 165 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994)
(arguing that courts grant authority to agencies when intended).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
9. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests
such responsibility in the political branches."'
What then is the proper judicial role with respect to the "wisdom of
the agency's policy" rather than its interpretation of statutory
language? As Justice Stevens and others have observed, this
question implicates not only the allocation of policy-making
authority between the courts and the agencies, but also indirectly
between the courts and the political branches." Following Justice
Stevens' lead, administrative law needs to turn its attention to this
issue.
I. A CATEGORIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY
Because the administrative process provides an intermediate
decision-making body between the creation of legislation and
judicial review, it requires a review system that can deal with
two separate categories of policy judgments: legislative and
administrative policymaking. These categories share a primary
characteristic. According to Professor Ronald Dworkin, the term
"policy" encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance or
protect some collective goal of the entire community as opposed to
those decisions that respect or secure some individual or group
right.1" For purposes of this Essay, policymaking is defined as those
government decisions that promote and protect societal values. The
legislative process, which involves participation by the legislative
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
11. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74
GEo. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1985).
12. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1975); see also HART &
SACKS, supra note 6, at 141 (A policy is simply a statement of objective.").
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and executive branches, is the foundational source of policy. Courts
in a common law system also participate in the policy-making
process although, as Landis observed, the very creation of the
administrative process was motivated by the desire to tailor policy-
making institutions to a particular need.'" For this reason, the
system has been forced to accept robust delegations and to find
implicit as well as explicit policy-making delegations.14
Our working definition might also help explain the common
characteristic: both legislative policymaking and administrative
policymaking share the objective of advancing or protecting
societal or communal values and goals.15 To some extent, the
Chevron doctrine is founded on the notion that interpretation and
policymaking are the same.16 Although at an abstract level this
observation cannot be challenged, it has proven misleading as a
guiding principle for developing a judicial review strategy.17
Operationally, statutory interpretation and administrative
policymaking must be distinguished. An optimum system for
developing decisions which further community values and goals
requires two quite distinct types of judicial involvement. Such an
assignment ofjudicial function implicates both the proper allocation
of authority, as Justice Stevens observed, and captures the full
benefit of both judicial and administrative comparative advantages.
13. See LANDIS, aupra note 3, at 39.
14. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-76 (2001) (striking down
attempted revitalization of the non-delegation doctrine by the D.C. Circuit).
15. Levin, supra note 11, at 12-13 (distinguishing between law and "discretion," a term
that encompasses what is referred to here as administrative policymaking). Professor Levin
has described the shared characteristic as "normative." Id.
16. See, e.g., David Barron & Elana Kagan, Chevrons Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 215 (2001).
17. The relatively insignificant case of Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996),
demonstrates the curious nature of presenting an agency policy change as a new reading of
the statute. In Lawrence, the authority of an agency to change its position related to a
conflict regarding the niceties of the Grant of Certiorari Vacation and Remand device (GVR).
The majority felt that GVR was proper in a case where 'a new interpretation of a statute
adopted by the agency charged with implementing it may be entitled to deference...." Id. at
172. In dissent, Justice Scalia observed simply that 'Ithe law is the law, whatever the
parties, including the United States, may have argued." Id. at 184 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of
course, an agency cannot change a statute even under the guise of 'interpretation.' Casting
the administrative policy-making authority in terms of the power to revise a statute made
the Lawrence majority's analysis at least misleading if not a bit silly. But see SKF USA, Inc.
v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying Lawrence faithfully).
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Precision in conceptualizing the respective policy-making functions
of the judiciary and the various administrative agencies is therefore
vital to the search for the best use of both in the context of the
administrative process.
The administrative process reaches policy conclusions in two
basic ways: an agency either applies policy decisions created by
another governmental institution or it creates the policy itself.
When an agency applies policy created by another branch of
government, the source is usually legislative, although it is
sometimes judicial, and much of the law about this category
of policy decision revolves around statutory interpretation.
Interpretation of a statute involves gleaning policy from the
legislation, a source independent from both the agency and the
reviewing court. Depending upon the circumstances, courts may
have as much, or more, interpretative authority than an agency.
They should and traditionally have been given dominant authority
because they are monitoring the agency to assure that the policy is
true to the legislation.s Furthermore, courts have some advantages
in performing interpretative functions the system needs to
capture.19
Traditionally, therefore, the courts have enjoyed a form of "de
novo" or "plenary" authority over statutory interpretation, but have
also recognized reasons to give agency interpretations "deference."
20
Courts today continue to express their basic role in terms of
this form of de novo or plenary review.2' These expressions are
18. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
19. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 214, 278
(1947).
20. See ATTORNEY GENERAL's COMMITTEE ONADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, 77TH CONG.,
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 90-91 (Comm. Print
1941) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT].
21. Since Chevron, Justice Stevens seems to have found this standard applicable. See
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479,493 (1991). Even recently, lower courts
have applied the standard. See, e.g., Tangv. INS, 223 F.3d 713,718-19 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting
that courts review legal determinations de novo); Akiak Native Cmty. v. Postal Serv., 213
F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000); Splude v. Apfel, 165 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Thus, our
review [of legal issues] is de novo, save as the Social Security Administration's view of the
statute may be entitled to some deference."); Fergiste v. INS, 138 F.3d 14, 17 (lst Cir. 1998)
("As always, we review questions of law de novo."); Getahun v. Office of Chief Admin.
Hearing Officer, 124 F.3d 591,594 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We apply a de novo standard of review to
an agency's conclusions of law ..... ); Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459 n.9 (5th Cir.
380 [Vol. 44:375
2002] JUDICIAL REVIEW
commonplace because courts are compelled to conduct plenary
review by the clear language of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).22 While "Chevron deference" may be said to require more
judicial respect for the agency interpretation than previously
dictated,' it fits generally within this well-established system.2'
Operationally, Chevron has largely defined the extent of such
deference. According to Professor Levin, it has "[tihe allure of a
single unifying framework for review of agencies' statutory
interpretations
The second method whereby the administrative process reaches
policy conclusions is through its authority to make policy itself
-"administrative policy." The restraint placed on judicial review of
administrative policymaking differs in both degree and nature
from that placed on review of statutory interpretation because
administrative policymakingis a fundamentally different operation.
1997) ("Review of a question of law is de novo."); Forest Guardians v. Dombeck, 131 F.3d
1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which is ...
reviewed de novo."); Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
('W]e review questions of law de novo.").
22. "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... otherwise not in accordance of law; ... in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
Both the Senate and House Reports on the APA scope of review section explain that "[tihis
subsection provides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the
last analysis and it also lists the several categories of questions of law." S. REP. No. 79-752,
at 214 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46,
at 214 (1997); H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 278 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 278 (1997).
23. Although prior to Chevron, agency interpretations received less deference, Justice
Stevens relied upon a number of earlier cases to support the conclusion that statutory
interpretation by agencies was entitled to greater judicial respect. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 n.14 (collecting cases).
24. According to the Attorney General's Committee, the APA anticipated the Chevron
doctrine by at least forty some years:
The question of statutory interpretation might be approached by the court de
novo and given the answer which the court thinks to be the "right
interpretation." Or the court might approach it ... to ascertain, not the "right
interpretation," but only whether the administrative interpretation has
substantial support .... Thus, where the statute is reasonably susceptible of
more than one interpretation, the court may accept that of the administrative
body.
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 90-91.
25. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1258 (1997).
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The classic statement of this notion was provided by Judge
Leventhal in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power
Commission." He recognized that "the breadth of agency discretion
is, if anything, at zenith when the action assailed relates primarily
... to the fashioning of policies...."" More recently, the Third Circuit
reiterated this well-established principle stating, "Absent such a
[procedural] challenge, a court may not second-guess the policy
choices made by an agency in a matter that Congress has
committed to the agency's discretion."' As a result, many courts
have recognized that their ability to review administrative policy is
extremely limited.29 The proper allocation of decision-making
authority demands this restraint. According to the Supreme
Court, "When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative
agency the authority to make specific policy determinations,
courts must give the agency's decision controlling weight unless
it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'"30
Courts continue to recognize their limited authority over adminis-
trative policymaking. 1
26. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
27. Id. at 159.
28. Schnall v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 279 F.3d 205,212 (3d Cir. 2002).
29. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
104 (1983); NLRB v. Boston Dist. Council of Carpenters, 80 F.3d 662, 665 (1st Cir. 1996);
United States v. Strong, 79 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1996); Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144,
1149 (D.C. Cir. 1995); NLRB v. W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989)
("Congress has given the Board wide latitude to interpret all aspects of statutory labor policy,
justifying a deferential review.").
30. ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317,324 (1994) (quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844).
31. Schnall, 279 F.3d at 212 ("[A) court may not second-guess the policy choices made by
an agency in a matter that Congress has committed to the agency's discretion."); Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554,560 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (regarding a question of policy, the
D.C. Circuit found, 'particular deference is given by the court to an agency with regard to
scientific matters in its area of technical expertise"); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1999); City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Judicial
deference to agency judgment is near its zenith ...."); Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d
1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1998); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir.
1998); Assoc. Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Subject, of
course, to statutory constraints, policy choices are for the agency, not the court, to make.").
382 [Vol. 44:375
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II. LONG ESTABLISHED REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYMAKING
A. Classic Precedent
The foundational application of this review principle may be
found in the classic opinion of SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery ).2
At issue in Chenery I was the legality of insider trading under the
then new Public Utility Holding Company Act. The Court said that
if the SEC was interpreting prior law to prohibit that practice then
the SEC's judgment was wrong and could not be upheld.88 If,
however, it intended to create a new policy under the authority
granted by Congress, the decision was beyond judicial power to
correct. Two sentences are sufficient to exemplify the Court's
adoption of this sound and workable system:
If the action rests upon an administrative determination-an
exercise ofjudgement in an area which Congress has entrusted
to the agency-of course it must not be set aside because the
reviewing court might have made a different determination
were it empowered to do so. But if the action is based upon a
determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the
courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency
has misconstrued the law.'
The Chenery I Court remanded the case so that the agency could
determine whether it wished to rely on the former type of
authority. 5 On remand, the SEC made it clear that it was making
administrative policy rather than interpreting judicially created
law, and that it arrived at the policy itself and did not glean the
policy from some external source." In SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery JJ),17 the Court affirmed the SEC's decision as a legitimate
exercise of the agency's policy-making authority. 8
32. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
33. Id. at 94.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 94-95.
36. See Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 154 F.2d 6, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (recounting SEC
justifications for action after Chenery 1), rev'd, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
37. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
38. Id. at 209.
2002] 383
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For generations, courts have conceded the dominant authority
over administrative policymaking to the agencies. Even before
Chenery I, the Supreme Court, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,3 9
recognized that "courts must not enter the allowable area of the
Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more
spacious domain of policy."' Forty years later, the Supreme
Court's decision in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild" was similarly
founded on the distinction between statutory interpretation and
administrative policymaking. At the beginning of the deregulation
movement, many felt that administrative withdrawal from reg-
ulation violated the very essence of an agency's statutory mandate.
In this instance, the FCC issued a policy statement regarding
license renewals and transfers in which it found that the public
interest would be best served by promoting program diversity in
broadcast entertainment through market forces and that regulatory
review of format changes was not required by the Communications
Act of 1934. A citizen group challenged the policy statement as a
violation of the Act. The lower court found that the FCC's decision
was one of statutory interpretation "in which the judicial word is
final." 2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judicial
function was extremely limited because the decision involved a
question of policy left to the "broad discretion" of the FCC.'3
The Supreme Court continues to recognize the limits on review
of administrative policymaking." In Arkansas v. Oklahoma,' for
example, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit because "the Court
of Appeals made a policy choice that it was not authorized to
make.' Additionally, in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,'" the
Court reiterated the traditional judicial approach to administrative
policymaking stating, "When Congress, through express delegation
39. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
40. Id. at 194.
41. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
42. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838,855 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582
(1981).
43. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 594.
44. See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994).
45. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
46. Id. at 113.
47. 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
384 [Vol. 44:375
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or the introduction of an interpretive gap in the statutory structure,
has delegated policymaking authority to an administrative agency,
the extent of judicial review of the agency's policy determination is
limited.""
Lower courts continue to apply this principle when they review
administrative policymaking. 9 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
recently applied the distinction between review of interpretations
of law and review of administrative policy in Gonzalez v. Reno.50 It
found that when Congress had delegated policymaking authority to
an agency, judicial review "must be very limited."5' Reading
Chevron with Chenery, the Court found that "the policy selected by
the agency must be a reasonable one in the light of the statutory
scheme. To this end, the courts retain the authority to check agency
policymaking for procedural compliance and for arbitrariness. But
the courts cannot properly reexamine the wisdom of an agency-
promulgated policy."52
The current debate regarding the extent to which an agency
may change policy illustrates the potency of this distinction. If
the question is whether an agency can alter the plain language of
a statute then the answer must be "of course not.""8 On the
other hand, if the question is whether an agency can change
agency policy, the answer is certainly "yes." Admittedly, the former
question is somewhat simplistic because agencies do change
interpretations of statutes, even though that is conceptually
tantamount to changing the legislation itself.54 To do so, however,
the agency must in essence confess error. It must admit that its
prior interpretation was wrong.55 On the other hand, an agency
may change its own policy by citing such factors as a change in
48. Id. at 696.
49. See cases cited supra note 31.
50. 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000).
51. Id. at 1349.
52. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
53. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-43 ("[Tihe Court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
54. Id. at 840-42 (describing EPA's change in its interpretation of the statutory term
"source").
55. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (noting the
FDA's contention that it erroneously interpreted various statutes controlling its powers as
excluding the ability to regulate tobacco for over forty years).
20021 385
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circumstances, new information, or experience with the existing
policy.5
6
In this regard, the Supreme Court's opinion in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. 57 provides a recent example of the power
of the policy-making distinction in allocating authority between
the courts and the agencies. In 1996, the FDA attempted to
regulate tobacco products despite a long history of disavowing
such jurisdiction. In asserting jurisdiction, the then current
FDA administration had to overcome what turned out to be an
insurmountable burden of proving that generations of prior
administrations were wrong. Justice O'Connor devoted much of the
majority's opinion to the long interaction between the FDA and
Congress in which the FDA consistently asserted that it did not
have jurisdiction and Congress passed several laws that, in effect,
"ratified" the agency's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco.5" The majority, as the dissent asserted, might be
seen as taking a very narrow view of administrative authority to
delve into new areas or adjust administrative policy to changing
circumstances.59 The Court, however, recognized the need for
general flexibility in evolving administrative policy stating that "an
agency's initial interpretation of a statute that it is charged with
administering is not 'carved in stone." It further accepted
prior case law, noting that "agencies 'must be given ample latitude
to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing
56. See, e.g., WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 450 U.S. 582, 593-603; City of Dallas v.
FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 1999) (-[Wle affirm the Commission's policy choice if it
considered competing arguments and articulated a reasonable basis for its conclusion.");
British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that once
the agency has justified its policy change, the new policy has the same force as that it
replaced); Rainbow Broad. Co. v. FCC, 949 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
57. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
58. Id. at 146, 157. A plausible reading of the Brown & Williamson majority opinion
limits it to this one very special industry:
Owing to its unique place in American history and society, tobacco has its own
unique political history. Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct
regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency
from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.
Id. at 161.
59. See id. at 162-64.
60. Id. at 157.
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circumstances." 6' Unfortunately, the majority in Brown &
Williamson found that the FDA was not adapting its policy, but
rather was trying to change the meaning of the statute from that
recognized by the agency, as well as Congress, for generations
-obviously, an ambitious, and in this case overly ambitious,
undertaking.
The dissent could be characterized as saying this was not a
question of statutory interpretation but a change in administrative
policy caused by a change in the "record."62 Writing for the four-
justice dissenting bloc, Justice Breyer contested the majority's
conclusion that the FDA did not have authority to make new policy.
He opined that the "literal language" and the "general purpose" of
the FDA's enabling act did not support the majority's view.63 The
dissent found a broad delegation of power that "could lead after
many years to an assertion of jurisdiction that the 1938 legislators
might not have expected."' To reconcile the agency's prior position,
Justice Breyer relied on the long line of cases supporting an
agency's power to change its policies in light of new information or
even political changes.65
The majority also relied on the "clear" language of the Act 6 6 which
provides that in order to regulate, the FDA must find some benefit
which justifies allowing the marketing of a product that presents
some health risk. 7 Because the FDA could identify no such
benefit, the Court found that the statute required it to ban
tobacco rather than regulate it and that such a ban would
contravene congressional intent.68 The FDA understood the
61. Id. (quoting MotorVehicle Mfrs. Ass'n ofUnited States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).
62. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (describing in detail the battle over FDA regulation of tobacco).
63. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 162-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 165 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 188 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases also relied on by the majority).
66. Id. at 142.
67. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(a) to 360(c) (2000). During the 2000 term the Supreme
Court firmly reiterated the notion that where the statutory language is clear, the sole
function of a court is to enforce the statute according to its terms. See Hartford Underwriters
v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 5 (2000).
68. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 142. The Court concluded:
Consequently, if tobacco products were within the FDA's jurisdiction, the Act
would require the FDA to remove them from the market entirely. But a ban
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statutory requirements and identified several societal benefits to
support regulation over a total ban. Despite this preemptive
maneuver, the majority concluded that only health benefits would
satisfy the statutory language.69 The dissenting Justices, in
contrast, found that such a view interfered with the evolution of
administrative policy and that Congress did not intend to restrict
the FDA's powers to craft remedies."0 According to Justice Breyer,
"The statute's language ... permits the agency to choose remedies
consistent with its basic purpose-the overall protection of public
health."71
In the end, the tension between the majority and the dissent in
Brown & Williamson can be characterized as a disagreement as to
whether the Court faced an effort by the FDA to repudiate its long
held statutory interpretation or whether the Court confronted
an agency decision to change administrative policy. Unfortunately
the FDA claimed, and the majority found, that the agency had
changed statutory interpretation rather than independently cre-
ating administrative policy. The FDA's advocacy thus weakened its
claim to regulatory authority over tobacco, authority the dissent
asserted it had, in fact, been assigned by Congress. Perceived in
terms of judicial power to review administrative policymaking, the
fundamental principles expressed by Justice Breyer compel the
conclusion that the Court was unduly arrogating agency authority.
New York v. FERC presented the Court in the 2002 term with
a similar controversy. FERC asserted jurisdiction over certain
retail electricity sales in the face of statutory language arguably
delegating that authority to state regulators. 7' All nine Justices
agreed with the agency's assertion of jurisdiction. The dissent,
however, concluded that the agency had not gone far enough
because it had a statutory duty to engage in even broader regu-
would contradict Congress' clear intent as expressed in its more recent,
tobacco-specific legislation. The inescapable conclusion is that there is no room
for tobacco products within the FDCA's regulatory scheme.
Id.
69. Id. at 139-43.
70. Id. at 179-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 177.
72. 122 S.Ct. 1012 (2002).
73. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2000).
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lation.7 4 On this issue, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
concluded that, while FERC may have additional jurisdiction, it
could choose "not to assert such jurisdiction.""' He found that the
"agency had discretion to decline to assert such jurisdiction"
and agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the agency's decision
"'represent[ed] a statutorily permissible policy choice." In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas found that the statute
unambiguously imposed a duty to regulate stating, "the [Federal
Power Act] does not give FERC discretion to base its decision not to
remedy undue discrimination on a 'policy choice.' 7"
Like many recent Supreme Court efforts, both opinions fail to
take advantage of well-established fundamental review principles
in administrative law because they ignore or fail to fully exploit the
administrative policy/statutory interpretation distinction. Justice
Stevens' reasoning v undoubtedly would have been crisper had
he invoked the long-recognized philosophy of judicial restraint in
cases involving administrative policymaking undertaken within an
agency's statutory authority. Although he suggested as much,
he could have been clearer that the Court was not reviewing
agency statutory interpretation but rather legitimate policymaking.
Indeed, not only would this have allowed him to rely on the
traditional restraint in reviewing policymaking, but this approach
would also have bolstered his opinion by incorporating the long line
of cases granting agencies nearly absolute discretion to decline to
act even if they have authority to do so.71
Justice Thomas' opinion, however, suffers the most as he reached
the startling conclusions that the agency was not free to make
policy, and perhaps even more surprisingly, that agencies have
no discretion in declining to exercise the full extent of their
statutory authority. Justice Thomas could have stayed within well-
established administrative law principles simply by applying the
74. New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct. at 1032 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1027.
76. Id. at 1028 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 1032 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Even assuming statutory ambiguity, Justice
Thomas would have found that FERC failed to explain its exercise of such discretion and
would have remanded the matter so that the agency could 'engage in reasoned
decisionmaking." Id. at 1036.
78. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); see also 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JIL,
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.4[1l (2d ed. 1997).
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APA review standard mandating invalidation of agency actions "in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right .... ."9 That is, he could have contested the threshold
question about the agency's statutory authority to engage in the
"policy choice" and thus, consistent with Chevron, could have
applied the clear language of the governing statutory provision.'0
Furthermore, he could have supported his conclusions without
violating generations of Supreme Court authority.
1. Effect of the Distinction on Judicial Remedies
The policy-making distinction carries forward in determining the
remedies available to courts. A mistaken characterization of the
agency action under review permits a court to arrogate power, not
only in degree and nature of its review, but additionally in taking
from the agency a decision assigned to it by Congress. When a court
reviews a statutory interpretation, it is authorized to substitute
judgment.8 " Thus, it may choose remedies that replace the agency's
decision. 2 If, on the other hand, a court reviews administrative
policymaking, it is not authorized to substitute judgment.' Its
remedies must allow the agency to adjust the policy the court finds
arbitrary or to cure an abuse of discretion. The court can do no more
than advise the agency as to where it went wrong and then step
back. Thus, the question of choice of remedies heightens the potency
of the distinction between review of statutory interpretation and
administrative policymaking.
In Chevron itself, the Court upheld the EPA's policy choice
-whether seen as the result of interpretation or its own
79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XC) (2000).
80. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Fund, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
81. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
82. This admonishment applies to disagreement on questions of law but manifests itself
differently from disagreements on policy. The Supreme Court ruled:
When an administrative agency has made an error of law, the duty ofthe Court
is to "correct the error of law committed by that body, and, after doing so to
remand the case to the [agency] so as to afford it the opportunity of examining
the evidence and finding the facts as required by law."
Int'l Light Metals v. United States, 279 F.3d 999, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting NLRB v.
Enter. Ass'n of Steam, Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 522 n.9 (1901)).
83. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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development-and hence it did not need to fashion a remedy."
Similarly, the Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Ass'n of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,5 which
found that the change in policy was arbitrary, remanded the case
to allow the agency to correct its decision.8" In contrast, the Court
in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 7 at the time referred
to as Chevron II, affirmed the D.C. Circuit, which had vacated
the FCC's decision.' In MCI, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to
affirmatively set limits on the options available to the agency.89
Similarly, in Brown v. Williamson, the Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that it was not reviewing the merits of the
tobacco regulation and therefore that the entire regulatory agenda
could not stand." Thus, to the extent that a court casts its opinion
as a review of statutory interpretation, as opposed to review of
administrative policy, it not only assumes the power to substitute
judgment, it also empowers itself to usurp the decision through its
choice of remedies.
2. Effect of the Distinction on the Allocation of Authority
Such judicial self-empowerment highlights the irony of the
"Chevron revolution." Despite being characterized as a reduction of
judicial authority vis-a-vfs the bureaucracy, the Chevron doctrine
in reality provides the vehicle for increasing judicial authority over
administrative decisions and leads courts to inject themselves into
decisions assigned to the agencies by Congress.9' This fact might
84. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
85. 403 U.S. 29 (1983).
86. See id. at 57.
87. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
88. Id.
89. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1191-96 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, 512
U.S. 218 (1994).
90. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
91. Even as to statutory interpretation, the doctrine is arguably less deferential than
asserted. See William S. Jordan III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of
Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454,484
(1989); Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129 (1993).
Furthermore, the doctrine has changed little in practice. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
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explain why agencies are more often reversed after Chevron.92 At
bottom, this trend might be what tugged at Justices Breyer, Scalia,
and Stevens in Christensen and Mead as discussed below.93
The review system should be designed around the allocation of
decision-making authority between the courts and the agency.
Application of the distinction between review of statutory
interpretation and review of administrative policymaking furthers
this goal. If controverted issues are characterized as agency
policymaking, then both the proper division of power and the
optimization of overall decision-making capabilities calls forjudicial
restraint. If a case involves statutory interpretation, both systemic
values are best served by careful judicial monitoring. Even
assuming the Chevron doctrine authorizes a more expansive
deference, review of statutory interpretation remains hefty.
B. Scope of Review of Policymaking
This foundational division of responsibility is also manifest in the
APA and the cases applying it. In accordance with the Chevron
doctrine itself, the inquiry begins with the statute at issue-the
APA. Although less clear than its provision regarding review
of statutory interpretation, the APA prescription for review of
administrative policymaking is reasonably clear when the language
is read in accordance with the usage of the period during which the
APA was enacted. The meaning of the term "discretion" in the
period in which the APA was conceptualized and ultimately
enacted is the key to understanding its commands for review of
administrative policymaking. The term discretion, in its broadest
sense, conveys some degree of decision-making freedom.9
92. Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from
Administrative Law, L. LEGAL. STUD. 61, 81 (2002). Smith and Tiller observed a thirty-two
percent increase in reversals after Chevron and argued that Chevron merely resulted in a
shift from judicial justifications for reversals based on statutory interpretation to reversals
based on failure in reasoning. Their observations support the notion that a shift to agency
advocacy based on Chevron deference from agency reliance on their own policy-making
authority and expertise has actually made agencies more vulnerable. See 3 KOCH, supra note
78, § 12.33 at 267-68.
93. See infra Part III.
94. For a discussion of the various meanings the term "discretion" has in the review
system, see 3 KOCH, supra note 78, §§ 10.6, 13.3, 13.4.
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Traditionally, the exercise of discretion, in terms of government
action at least, can be seen-as encompassing policymaking. Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury used the term in that way stating:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.
But where [the officer] is directed by law to do a certain act
affecting the absolute rights of individuals .. it is not perceived
on what ground the courts of the country are further excused
from the duty giving judgment ......
It is reasonably clear that those involved with the development
of the APA meant administrative policymaking when they used
the term discretion. For example, in discussing the object of
rulemaking, the authors of the Final Report of the Attorney
General's Committee observed that "[the situation is different in
rule making or other discretionary determinations which involve,
in effect, the formulation of new policies."9" Levin concluded that
APA review had long recognized that administrative policy
determinations should be reviewed only for "abuse of discretion."97
The terms and intent of the APA reflect the notion that
administrative policymaking should be reviewed as the exercise of
discretion. Under this standard, a court cannot hold agency policy
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (emphasis added).
96. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMriTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 117.
97. Levin, supra note 11, at 12-13. The jurisprudence that defines unreviewable
"discretion" suggests that sense of the term. Both the APA legislative history and the key
Overton Park decision define such discretion as encompassing those circumstances in which
there is "no law to apply." See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
410 (1970) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). For example, the House report, relied
on by the Court said, "Matters of discretion are necessarily exempted from the section, since
otherwise courts would in effect supercede agency functioning. But that does not mean that
questions of law properly presented are withdrawn from reviewing courts."H.R. REP. No. 79-
1980, at 275 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1944-46, at 275 (1997).
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unlawful unless it finds an "abuse," or more often that term's
partner, "arbitrary or capricious" action.98
One of the most effective means to assess arbitrariness in
the review of administrative policymaking context is to deter-
mine whether the agency took a "hard look.'" In Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, " Judge Levanthal suggested that a court
should overturn certain decisions only "if the court becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has
not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." 1 Somehow, the
phrase has taken on its own meaning and has been interpreted to
require the court to take a hard look.1 2 In its original form, as
derived from application of the arbitrariness and abuse standards,
the word formula serves as an instructive expression for the special
judicial restraint in analyzing administrative policy decisions. It
properly defines the division of authority over such policy decisions
between the agency and the reviewing court.
The leading Supreme Court case actually striking down an
agency decision under the arbitrariness test, State Farm, is the best
example of the hard look test in application. In this case, the Court
reviewed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
abandonment of seatbelt regulations. Although the Court did not
use the term hard look, its decision can best be characterized as a
hard look approach to applying the arbitrariness standard. The
Court did not reject the agency's policy change through a judicial
hard look, but it did find danger signals suggesting that the agency
had not taken a hard look at the issues involved in making that
change. From this conclusion, it determined that the agency
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA). See Ronald Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated:
Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 292 (1986) ("No distinctions are
drawn among the terms 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion' in § 706(2XA).").
99. See Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177,
181.
100. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
101. Id. at 851 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Harold Levanthal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974)
(explaining the application of Judge Leventhal's review framework in the environmental
context).
102. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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policymaking failed the arbitrariness test.103 In applying the
arbitrariness word formula, it observed that an agency's decision is
"arbitrary and capricious if the agency has ... entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem .... The Court
was particularly disturbed by the agency's failure to explain
some curious choices and, after noting several danger signals,
concluded that the agency had not conscientiously undertaken its
responsibilities. 0 5
III. TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION: CHRISTENSEN AND MEAD AS
CASE STUDIES
Accepting the significance, under the APA and generations
of judicial authority, of a categorical distinction between the
questions of review of statutory interpretation and review of
administrative policymaking, administrative law needs to correct
the huge imbalance between the recent scholarly treatment of the
two review functions. An effort to adapt some of the thinking and
experience regarding statutory interpretation might advance the
development of administrative policymaking review. Christensen
and Mead, as very recent cases, might provide fruitful examples for
the adaptation of Chevron doctrine jurisprudence to the question of
review of administrative policymaking.
This Essay will address Mead first because its two opinions
adapt more easily to the review of agency policymaking and the
impact of such review on the allocation of authority between the
courts, the agencies, and ultimately, the legislature. The Court
considered the force of Customs "ruling letters." " In a ruling letter,
the Customs Service changed its classification of Mead's day
planner from duty-free status to bound diaries subject to tariff. The
Federal Circuit found that ruling letters did not have the force of
law and hence, were entitled to no judicial deference. The Supreme
Court reasoned from the premise that the ruling letters were
statutory interpretations, and therefore, it ultimately found that
103. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-56.
104. Id. at 43.
105. Id. at 52-57. The Court undertook the same sort of analysis inArkanaas u. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992).
106. Mead, 553 U.S. at 222.
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these decisions did not justify Chevron deference but did warrant
the deference given in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,07 in other words,
consideration of their persuasive power.' 08
Assume that the agency ruling letter decisions were not statutory
interpretations but rather expressions of an administrative policy.
This characterization is made more plausible by the fact that the
ruling was based on a Customs regulation or "schedule," the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), and not
directly on an interpretation of a statute as in Skidmore."°9 The
ruling letters thus were interpretations of the legislative rule. °
Assuming that the ruling letters announced a change in policy, the
opinions would not change but would rest more comfortably on
the appropriate allocation of authority between the courts and
the agencies. That is, the reasoning, even the debate among the
Justices, has different implications for the overarching operation of
the administrative system. From that perspective, a recasting of the
ruling letter opinions might reveal the systemic impact of the
distinction between review of administrative interpretations of law
and review of administrative policymaking.11'
107. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
108. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
109. See id. at 221.
110. Id. In our system HTSUS must be characterized as a set of legislative rules. HTSUS
is "recommended" by the International Trade Commission and issued by presidential decree.
19 U.S.C. § 3004 (2000). After promulgation, it is incorporated by reference into the statute
itself. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). It is our system's closest relation to "delegated legislation"
in a parliamentary system. Delegated legislation is literally legislation made by the
executive, which is part of the legislature. See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORsYTH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 859 (1994). In our system, however, in which the legislature and the
executive are constitutionally separate, Congress cannot delegate actual legislative authority
and hence, rulemaking may not be considered "legislation." Thus, the HTSUS must be seen
as legislative rules made pursuant to delegated authority. See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281,304-06 (1979) (inquiring into whether an executive order represents sufficient delegation
to be "law").
111. The circumstances in this particular regulatory scheme are more complicated than
most. The Act delegates to the President the authority to set the tariffs upon the
recommendations of the ITC. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. The ITC is an
independent agency. 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000). Its authorization, however, requires it to
.cooperate" with the Treasury Department among others. 19 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000). The
Service is housed within the Department of Treasury. 19 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000). The Service,
on behalf of the Secretary of Treasury, was providing its interpretation of the ITC
recommended tariff schedule. The Treasury Department has delegated authority to make
rules. 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (2000). Procedures for modifying interpretative rulings are
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The analytical value of the distinction might be demonstrated by
converting Justice Souter's reasoning in Mead into review of a
policy judgment by the Service rather than an administrative
attempt at statutory interpretation. This view is not actually too far
afield because he was in fact reviewing "implementation of a
particular statutory provision."'12 Indeed, review of implementation
may easily be expressed as review of the "wisdom of the agency's
policy""3-to use Justice Stevens' language in Chevron-especially
because it involved the interpretation of a regulation. Justice Souter
conceded that the agency had such policy-making responsibility. For
example, he distinguished the ruling letter from "the legislative
type activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the
ruling."14 The very expression "legislative type activity" does not
seem consistent with an interpretative activity, but rather fits
more closely into Justice Stevens' category of administrative
policymaking. Similarly, Justice Souter asserted that the rulings
did not have precedential force as would the results of formal
adjudication. 115 The evolution of "rules" in the form of precedent
is the adjudicative form of administrative policymaking.116 As
with policymaking in quasi-legislative processes, it is not truly
interpretation although it must be done within the boundaries of
the statute.
Even though Justice Souter seems to treat the decision as policy-
making, he was forced to reason in terms of statutory interpretation
because that is what the Service claimed to have done. Nonetheless,
established by 19 U.S.C. § 1625 (2000). Thus, the Service was not interpreting or
implementing its own regulation. If it had been, the Court might have applied the well
established principle that a court should give special weight to an agency's interpretation of
its own rule. See FEC v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 254 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Instead, the
Service was interpreting another agency's policy, that of the ITC. The Service was not
interpreting statutory law. The conceptual difference between the Service's policy if made
pursuant to delegated authority and the pronouncement here, without such authority,
remains.
112. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226.
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
114. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 231-40. Under the APA, the action in which this policy was expressed may best
be classified as a "declaratory order" authorized by § 554(e) and thus is related, at least, to
adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2000). Generations of opinions have established the
principle that agencies may create and announce policy in adjudications as they may find it
necessary to interpret the relevant statutory language.
116. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969).
20021 397
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Justice Souter alternately saw the core question as: Did Congress
delegate authority to make policy to the Customs Service, although
it certainly did not delegate authority to change the statute? He
answered that question, as did Justice Stevens in Chevron, in the
affirmative. 117 True to established administrative law principles,
however, he asked whether the Service intended to exercise this
policy-making function. Again using traditional analysis, he found
it did not." Having done so, he shifted to the Skidmore test"19 as
courts have done for generations. 20 This test recognizes that even
if an agency does not rely on its delegated policy-making
authority--the exercise of which would make the agency's decision
dominant-its policy decisions should be given respect consistent
with "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's
position."121
Justice Scalia, with the instincts of an administrative law
scholar, recognized the systemic values at issue, despite the need to
couch his opinion in the language of Chevron. 2 Expressed in terms
of appropriate review of administrative policymaking, he saw the
need to guard against judicial arrogation of authority. Because the
Customs Service was established to make customs policy, he
distrusted judicial efforts to substitute judicial policymaking for
that of the agency. 128 Thus, to Justice Scalia, the question of the
proper judicial function properly revolved around whether the
agency made an authoritative policy decision. That is, the true
question was whether the agency itself, according to its decision-
making hierarchy, made the policy as opposed to some lesser
authority within the agency. Consistent with this analysis, even if
the policy is made at the lower level, for generations the proper
judicial function has been to return the matter to the agency for it
117. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
118. Id. at 231-32; see Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (conducting a similar analysis).
119. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
120. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 237 (1974).
121. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
122. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to make the authoritative policy choice.1 ' Because he saw the
actual question as the allocation of authority between the courts
and "executive officers," Justice Scalia began with the foundational
understanding derived from the evolution of the mandamus
remedy.125 Mandamus, of course, cannot be used to question a
"discretionary" act of an executive officer, or any discretionary
act. 126 At base, the application of that mundane doctrine guided the
now hallowed Marbury opinion.2 7 Justice Scalia thus could be seen
as worrying about the same systemic values as those expressed by
Chief Justice Marshall. 12
As a forerunner to Mead, Christensen may also be read in terms
of the difference between review of an agency's assertion of
statutory authority to make policy and review of the policy itself. In
Christensen, the Court was reading the statute to determine
whether the agency policymaking at issue was within the statutory
grant of authority. The Department of Labor (DOL) asserted
authority under an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
that brought public employees within the Act but allowed public
employers, unlike private employers, to compensate employees for
overtime with leave time, "comp-time."1" The County sought to
reduce accumulated comp-time by requiring employees to use that
time because it was afraid that its budget could not handle the cash
equivalent. It sought guidance from the DOL. In an opinion letter,
the Acting Administrator of DOL's Wage and Hour Division took
the position that public employers may compel employees to accept
comp-time only if the employees agreed in advance to such a
practice. 130
Again the Court found that the opinion letter was an incorrect
interpretation of the Wage and Hour rules, rather than of the
statute directly.18' It also clearly decided, however, that the
Division's policy was inconsistent with the statute. Thus, it seems
that the DOL could not have prohibited a policy such as the
124. 2 KOCH, supra note 78, § 8.31, at 519-20.
125. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 242-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 16S-80.
128. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 579"0.
130. Id. at 580-81.
131. Id. at 580-88.
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County's even in a legislative rule. As such, Christensen is a
conceptually different opinion from Mead or even Chevron. The
contrast highlights the potency of the distinction between policy
gleaned from statutory interpretation and policy created within
delegated authority. That is, the majority was saying that the policy
itself violated the statute and the agency could not adopt that policy
even as an exercise of its authority to make policy, even if promul-
gated through legislative rulemaking.
It is not clear that the Christensen majority actually meant to go
this far. Nonetheless, dissenting in Christensen, Justice Breyer
suggested that had the policy been embodied in a legislative rule
would have survived even under the majority's review principles.182
Yet, he suggested that legislative rulemaking was not necessary to
make policy authoritative. He noted that Skidmore was a useful
test to apply to an agency's "views" "even if they do not constitute
an exercise of delegated lawmaking authority."133 By distinguishing
this case from Chevron, one might reasonably expect that Justice
Breyer would accept such policy decisions if pursuant to delegated
authority and that at least some members of the majority would
have upheld it under that delegation. After all, Justice Thomas
made something of the fact that the letter misinterpreted the
legislative rule as well as the statute.'3 4
In its recent Barnhart v. Walton13 5 opinion, the Court again
looked to see if the policy was within the agency's authority. In an
opinion by Justice Breyer, it found that the agency's policy was due
substantial deference because it was within the agency's authority.
Hence, this opinion provides a useful comparison with Christensen.
Walton filed for Social Security disability benefits. The Act provided
that in order to receive such benefits the disability must prevent or
be expected to prevent a person from engaging in substantial
gainful employment for at least twelve months."3 6 Walton returned
to work within eleven months of the loss of his teaching job for
severe mental illness. The Social Security Administration (SSA)
found that an impairment that did not in fact last twelve months
132. Id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 588.
135. 122 S. Ct 1265 (2002).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 423(dXIXA) (2000).
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did not entitle a person to benefits. The Court concluded that the
Act did not prohibit the agency's interpretation and that the
interpretation was permissible under the Act.17 Thus, the agency
acted within its permissible policy-making authority. 38 Barnhart
also solidified Breyer's position in Christensen that policymaking
within the agency's delegated authority would have special force
even if not developed through notice and comment rulemaking, i.e.
not embodied in a legislative rule.' In sum, once a reviewing court
finds that the agency has crossed the threshold into authorized
policymaking, a court must accept the agency's policy choices unless
they are arbitrary or an abuse of the policy-making discretion
delegated to the agency by Congress.
The distinction between review of statutory interpretation and
review of authorized administrative policymaking may also provide
insight into the tension between the opinions in MCI, which has
been seen as an embellishment of the Chevron doctrine.14 ° Section
203 of the Communications Act requires communications common
carriers to file tariffs with the FCC but authorizes the Commission
to "modify any requirement made by or under ... this section.... 1m
Relying on the latter provision, the FCC adopted a policy in which
tariff filings would be optional for all nondominant long distance
carriers." 2 AT&T, the only dominant long distance carrier, objected,
claiming that such a rule did more than "modify" the statutory
language. The Supreme Court agreed. To reach its conclusion, the
majority engaged in a survey of the definition of "modify" in
various dictionaries.148 It decided against the agency because
"[vlirtually every dictionary" defined the term as limited to mod-
137. Barnhart, 122 S. Ct. at 1270.
138. Id. at 1273 (MThe statute's complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders,
and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead us to
read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through
interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration.").
139. Id. at 1271. Justice Scalia, concurring, correctly admonishes the Court, however, that
once it accepts that legislative rulemaking is not necessary to make binding policy it "should
state why those interpretations were authoritative enough (or whatever-else-enough Mead
requires) to qualify for deference." Id. at 1274 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 203(bX2) (2000).
142. MCI, 512 U.S. at 221.
143. Id. at 225-26.
20021 401
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
erate or incremental change. '4 The rule here, it felt, constituted a
fundamental change and therefore went "beyond the meaning that
the statute can bear .... 14
Justice Stevens, with Justices Blackmun and Souter, dissented.
The dissent began by observing that "[tihe communications
industry has an unusually dynamic character."" 6 In that context,
the dissenters thought that Congress did not intend the statute to
be interpreted through "a rigid literalism.""7 Such an approach
"deprives the FCC of the flexibility Congress meant it to have in
order to implement the core policies of the Act in rapidly changing
conditions."148 Under the circumstances, the dissenters opined that,
rather than testing the agency's action against that dictated by the
majority of dictionaries, the court should have asked whether the
new policy was "consistent with the purposes of the statute." ' 9
Whether they were correct in finding that the FCC's policy met
that test, their approach might be preferred if the FCC is seen
as making communication policy consistent with Congress's
expectations. Moreover, leaving that policy decision to the agency
constitutes the best, as well as the intended, allocation of authority
between the courts and the agencies.
As discussed above, proper characterization of the source of the
policy avoids the danger of overly intrusive judicial remedies
aggravating the systemic damage to the proper allocation of
authority. The Court in both Christensen and Mead, having
asserted authority over statutory interpretation undertook the
intrusive remedies appropriate to substitution ofjudgment review.
Thus, in Mead, it returned the matter to the lower court mandating
that the court conduct de novo review of the agency decision." In
Christensen, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's grant of
144. Id. at 225.
145. Id. at 229.
146. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238-39. This review may be more appropriate in the customs
system. See Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More into the Breach: Reconciling
Chevron Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review after United States v. Haggar Apparel
Company, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1167 (2000) (providing commentary before Mead was decided).
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summary judgment in favor of Harris County151 and hence, negated
the Wage and Hour Division's decision." Yet, the Court said, "[t]o
defer to the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under
the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation."'53 Under traditional administrative law principles,
when a court finds that the agency's interpretation is actually an
amendment to a legislative rule, it typically remands for notice and
comment rulemaking rather than taking on the rulemaking
authority itself. 'i That is, courts have felt compelled to remand and
order the agency to make the authoritative policy decisions through
the appropriate procedures.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have tried to reintroduce the question of review
of administrative policy into discussions about the design of the
judicial review system. Interpretation of unclear statutory language
has much of the character of policymaking. But treating interpre-
tation and policymaking in the same manner robs the judicial
review system of a fundamental strategy. The review system suffers
by ignoring the instrumental difference between deriving policy
from a statute and making policy under statutory authorization.
Again, agencies undeniably find policy from other sources,
particularly by gleaning policy from statutory language, including
filling legislative gaps. They are, however, generally in some
fashion also assigned the task of extending the legislative process.
The review system is enriched by recognizing the two different
decision-making tasks. A review system incorporating this fun-
damental distinction better allocates decision-making resources and
capacity between the courts and the agencies (and hence indirectly
the legislatures).
The distinction is more than instrumental, however. The very
authorization of this independent policy-making function has
implications for the legitimacy of the assumption of decision-
151. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1998).
152. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. 2 KOCH, supra note 78, § 8.32, at 537.
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making authority. As Justice Stevens recognized in Chevron: "When
a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within the gap left
open by Congress, the challenge must fail."155 This is an over-
statement because both the APA and traditional law recognize some
judicial function even in review of administrative policymaking. But
that function differs in nature as well as degree from review of
statutory interpretation.
Here, I assert that administrative law needs to return to that
category of judicial review. While some thinking surrounding the
Chevron doctrine will certainly be of use, the questions, when seen
in terms of the proper and best allocations of authority, are
fundamentally different.
155. Chevron, 476 U.S. at 866.
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